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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  farming  of  Paciﬁc  white  shrimp  Litopennaeus  vannamei  in  northeast  Brazil,  has  proven  to be a  promis-
ing  sector.  However,  the  farming  of Paciﬁc  white  shrimp  in Brazil  has  been  affected  negatively  by  the
occurrence  of viral  diseases,  threatening  this  sector’s  expansion  and  sustainability.  For  this  reason,  the
drafting  of a surveillance  system  for early  detection  and  deﬁnition  of  freedom  from  viral  diseases,  whose
occurrence  could  result  in  high  economic  loses,  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  stochastic  model  Aqua-
Vigil  was  implemented  to prospectively  evaluate  different  surveillance  strategies  to  determine  freedomhrimp aquaculture Brazil
isk-based surveillance
quaVigil
from disease  and  identify  the strategy  with  the  lowest  sampling  efforts,  making  the  best use  of  available
resources  through  risk-based  surveillance.  The  worked  example  presented  was  designed  for  regional
application  for the  state  of  Ceará  and  can  easily  be  applied  to  other  Brazilian  states.  The AquaVigil
model  can  analyse  any  risk-based  surveillance  system  that  considers  a similar  outline  to  the  strategy
here  presented.
© 2015  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
The growing global demand of aquatic animals and aquatic
nimal products has led to high rates of production and trade fre-
uency and increased concern over the occurrence and spread of
iral diseases affecting various cultured species. As a result, many
ations have adopted surveillance strategies to protect their aqua-
ulture sector (FAO, 2014). The threat to aquaculture sustainability
nd safe international trade has also led countries to apply trade
tandards based on their own aquatic animal health status (FAO,
014). When able to demonstrate that a particular disease agent is
bsent, a country can facilitate trade or apply import risk analysis
FAO, 2014; WTO, 2014).
The absence of infection, from here on referred to as freedom
rom disease, can be determined through the aggregation over time
f negative outcomes generated from a surveillance system. Docu-
enting freedom from disease requires a large sample frame and so
urveillance activities should selectively target the high-risk strata
f the population through risk-based surveillance (RBS) (Cameron,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: ritinha@usp.br (A.R. Marques).
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167-5877/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.2009). In this paper, a stochastic model based on scenario tree mod-
elling was implemented to determine the probability of freedom
obtained for certain surveillance efforts, so that the best strategy
can be determined prospectively. The model outputs will provide
decision makers with the information to implement surveillance
efforts to achieve a desired probability of freedom. The surveillance
system will also ensure early disease detection.
In northeast Brazil, the farming of Paciﬁc white shrimp Litopen-
naeus vannamei has been an important source of income for
large-scale producers and also the main or supplementary income-
generating activity for the poorest rural communities and their
small-scale farmers. In many cases, the occurrence of viral dis-
eases has lead to the abandonment of farming activities (Ostrensky
et al., 2008). There is to date, unclear knowledge on the geo-
graphic extent and impact to which viral diseases have affected the
countries shrimp aquaculture sector. From the list of notiﬁable viral
diseases in shrimp populations drafted by the Brazilian Ministry
of Fisheries and Aquaculture (MPA), the Centre for Environment,
Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas) references the presence
of White Spot Syndrome Virus (WSSV), Infectious Myonecrosis
Virus (IMNV), Infectious Hypodermal and Hematopoietic Necrosis
Virus (IHHNV) and Taura Syndrome Virus (TSV), initially ruling out
efforts for determining country-level freedom. Meanwhile, other
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iral pathogens such as Yellowhead Virus (YV) have yet to be iden-
iﬁed at a national level (CEFAS, 2014; DOU, 2015).
The MPA  has recognized the threat of viral diseases to the
quacultured shrimp populations and the need to strengthen dis-
ase surveillance (MPA, 2011). The needed surveillance system
ust encounter international acceptance and therefore follow
orld Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) surveillance guidelines
Corsin et al., 2009; OIE, 2014a). Implementing surveillance efforts
o declare disease-free status can lead to early disease detection
nd identiﬁcation of disease-free zones. The model can be applied
o any one of the listed notiﬁable viral diseases, as the epidemi-




The AquaVigil model evaluates the results of implementing two
ypes of surveillance system components that are activities that
enerate the needed information to determine freedom from dis-
ase: one active surveillance system component (ActiveSC) and
ne passive surveillance system component (PassiveSC). Surveil-
ance system sensitivity (SSe), that is, the probability of the
urveillance system detecting disease if it were present, can be
stimated considering the joint contribution of the two surveil-
ance components that make up the surveillance system: the
assiveSC sensitivity (SePassiveSC) and the ActiveSC sensitivity
SeActiveSC).
The model was developed in R environment and is available
s the AquaVigil function in the Supplementary Document 1 with
xample data in the Supplementary Document 2 and using the
c2d, plyr, ggplot and Hmisc packages (R Development Core Team,
008). The simulation comprised of 10,000 iterations and set a
xed random number seed for reproducible random results. Model
nputs necessary for analysis are a comma-separated values (CSV)
le with an ID column, four columns characterizing the presence (1)
r absence (0) of four risk factors (RFs) and a ﬁfth column specifying
he number of samples retrieved from each farm. Prospectively, we
an determine the SePassiveSC, the SeActiveSC, the SSe, the proba-
ility of freedom obtained through surveillance, the sample size for
he ActiveSC and campaigns needed to achieve a desired probability
f freedom. Other model outputs include a correlation analysis for
urveillance system component sensitivities, the achieved prob-
bility of freedom after a single surveillance campaign and the
ensitivity ratio for the ActiveSC (SR).
.1.1. Data sources
A past census of the productive, technological, economical,
ocial and environmental aspects of Brazil’s aquaculture sector was
rafted for the year of 2011 and the data provided by shrimp grow-
ut farms when questioned for this census was the data here used.
rom the available data, the worked example presented for deter-
ining disease freedom for the state of Ceará accounts for 325
row-out farms, parameterized for the presence and absence of
he selected RFs. The census data provided the coordinates for 273
f the 325 farms. To roughly illustrate the density of farmed areas,
 map  of such farms is provided in Fig. 1. From this map, the main
arming areas are visible along the Jaguaribe River and delta, to the
outh, and the Acaraú River delta, to the North (ABCC/MPA, 2013).
.1.2. States to deﬁne disease-free zones
Dispersion of infectious agents through water occurs frequently
nd at a rapid rate (Hoa et al., 2011; Lotz, 1997; Moss et al., 2012).
his would strongly suggest the rapid spread of the pathogens
etween farms in interconnecting water systems. Therefore, theFig. 1. Map  of shrimp grow-out farms in the state of Ceará.
level at which disease freedom can be deﬁned should be reason-
ably large. Furthermore, shrimp grow-out farms will frequently use
post-larvae (PL) from PL suppliers in their state. Given the previ-
ous considerations, the state level was considered to deﬁne disease
freedom. The state level will also allow a more efﬁcient organiza-
tional approach to surveillance. A worked example of the AquaVigil
model for Brazil’s state of Ceará is presented, as this was  determined
as one of the leading states for aquacultured shrimp production
(ABCC/MPA, 2013).
2.1.3. Surveillance of farmed populations
The “Report of the meeting of the Task Force on Animal Dis-
ease Surveillance Brussels, 24 and 25 June 2009” addressed how
to demonstrate disease freedom from WSSV. The task force dis-
cussed how surveillance at the farm level would sufﬁce when the
disease is well known and the population in the farms is represen-
tative of both wild and farmed populations (European Commission,
2009). Taking into account the aforementioned conditions and the
data available, only sampling of shrimp from grow-out farms was
considered.
2.1.4. Time period for analysis
Australian authorities considered one campaign as sufﬁcient
to determine disease freedom for WSSV (East et al., 2004, 2005).
Here we consider a single campaign both sufﬁcient and most desir-
able to determine a cost-effective surveillance strategy, given the
contribution of both surveillance system components. The water
temperatures that could determine a higher probability of clini-
cal signs of disease at certain time periods, are relatively constant
for Brazil’s northeast states, and so there is no time of year rec-
ommended to perform surveillance activities (Nunes et al., 2005).
Therefore, the time periods for analysis of the surveillance system
results will cover one year of surveillance.






































bFig. 2. The scenario tree for the a
.1.5. Design prevalence
In the absence of positive ﬁndings, the surveillance system
an be applied to determine that disease is absent at a level
qual to or greater than that of the design prevalence (Cameron,
009). To incorporate the effect of clustering, two values of design
revalence can be used in the model: animal level design preva-
ence (Pu*) and farm level design prevalence (Ph*). For highly
ontagious diseases, such as those affecting species in an aquatic
nvironment, a high proportion of infected animals are expected,
nd therefore, high values of design prevalence can be used
Martin et al., 2007). The OIE recommends the adoption of val-
es of 1–5% for Pu* for slow-moving diseases and above 5%
or highly contagious diseases, while values for Ph* should not
xceed 2%, unless clearly justiﬁed (Corsin et al., 2009). However,
ublished articles of Australian surveys, to determine country-
evel freedom from WSSV, used two sets of values for Ph* and
u*: one where both took the ﬁxed value of 10% and another
here Ph* was set at 5% and Pu* was set at 10% (East et al.,
004, 2005). Keeping in mind the aforementioned values, for the
orked example, the design prevalence was set at a value of 10%
or Pu*, while the value of Ph* was kept conservatively lower,
t 5%.
.1.6. Test sensitivity
The OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals refers
o molecular techniques, such as PCR followed by sequencing, for
argeted surveillance to declare freedom for viral diseases affect-
ng shrimp (Corsin et al., 2009; OIE, 2014b). The test sensitivity,
 measure of the tests ability to identify truly infected animals,
s considered to be high for tests based on molecular techniques
Corsin et al., 2009). A survey to determine disease-free status for
SSV in Australia considered a point value of 95% test sensitivity
or the OIE recommended PCR protocol from Lo (1996) (East et al.,
005; OIE, 2014b). Consequently, these were the values considered
or the test sensitivity for both initial PCR screening and conﬁrma-
ory diagnosis through sequencing. The combined test sensitivity
as set as the product of individual test sensitivities. Since
ollow-up testing to investigate true status of infection is always
pplied, the speciﬁcity of the testing protocol is considered to
e 100%.surveillance system component.
2.2. Active SSC
Active surveillance generates information on the health status
of a population through the periodic collection of samples. In order
to reduce the sample size needed to determine disease-free status,
the ActiveSC will account for targeted sampling of grow-out farms
at greatest risk of disease introduction, through RBS.
2.2.1. Scenario tree
A scenario tree illustrates the process by which the surveillance
component can result in disease detection. In the scenario tree, fac-
tors affecting the probability that an individual unit or grouping
level of units is infected are taken into account to determine the
SeActiveSC. The SeActiveSC was  determined using the methodol-
ogy of Martin et al. (2007) based on the conceptual scenario tree
in Fig. 2. For reasons of practicality, the scenario tree illustrates
but one possible path to disease detection, considering high-risk
farms those accounting for the presence of all RFs. Furthermore,
the RFs are considered independent and their order unimportant
in the scenario tree.
2.2.2. SeActiveSC
The relative risks (RRs) for the RFs represented as risk nodes in
the scenario tree are adjusted according to Eqs. (1) and (2)) so that
the average RR of a representative sample of the reference popula-
tion in a risk node is 1, while maintaining a relativity speciﬁed in
the inputs.
AR1 = RR1/(RR1 ∗ PropRR1 + PropRR0) (1)
AR0 = 1/(RR1 ∗ PropRR1 + PropRR0) (2)
where AR1 and AR0 are the adjusted risks for the RRs presence (1)
and absence (0) and PropRR1 and PropRR0 are the proportions of
the reference population that fall into the two branches of the risk
node. The AR values are used to determine the effective probabil-
ity of a farm being infected (EPIH), if infection is present at Ph*
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here R is the number of RFs and EPIHs is determined for every s risk
trata. The AquaVigil model accounts for four RFs, each with two
ossible outcomes, for a total of 16 (=24) risk strata. The unit sensi-
ivity (SeU) is the probability that a single animal will give a positive
esult, if tested, and is set as the product of initial and conﬁrmatory
est sensitivities. When SeU is multiplied by the probability of a
nit being infected, Pu*, we have the probability of a positive test
esult for a single randomly selected unit. The grow-out farm level
ensitivity (SeH) is the probability that infection will be detected at
he farm level. For each sampled farm, a value of SeH is determined
y the binomial method (Eq. (4)), as the number of shrimp sampled
er farm will be lower than 10% of the total number of shrimp in a
row-out farm.
eH = 1 − (1 − SeU ∗ Pu∗)n (4)
here n is the number of animals sampled for each farm.
To determine the SeActiveSC, the probability of detecting infec-
ion at the state grouping level, the hypergeometric method is used
ince the number of sampled farms will be above 10% of the total
umber of farms in the state (Eq. (5)).
eActiveSC = 1 −
S∏
s=1
(1 − SeHavs ∗ ns/Ns)(Ns∗EPIHs) (5)
or s risk strata, where:
SeHavs is the average SeH for the sth risk strata;
ns is the number of sampled farms in the sth risk strata;
Ns is the number of farms in the population for the sth risk strata.
.2.3. Sensitivity ratio
In order to compare the sensitivity of targeted risk-based samp-
ing with equivalent random sampling, a SR of these values is
eturned as an output of the AquaVigil model to assess the effective-
ess of the targeted surveillance approach. An equivalent random
ample was considered a sample with the same number of farms
nd the same number of sampled animals per farm. A SR superior
o 1 indicates a gain in sensitivity, while lower values reﬂect loss
n sensitivity and values equal to one an equal sensitivity between
ampling strategies.
.2.4. Random sampling
The samples collected for RBS are compared to the needed
amples size if performing representative random sampling of
he population. The number of sampled farms (Nrepresentative) (Eq.
6)) and animals (nrepresentative) (Eq. (7)) per farm for a representa-
ive random sample was determined using a two-stage sampling
ethod (Cameron et al., 2014).
representative = (N/SeHdesired) ∗
(




representative = ln(1 − SeHdesired)/ln(1 − SeU ∗ Pu∗) (7)
here:
N is the number of farms in the state;
SeHdesired is the desired farm level sensitivity;
SSedesired is the desired sensitivity for the surveillance system;
Ph* is the design prevalence at farm level;
SeU is the product of diagnostic test sensitivities;
Pu* is the design prevalence at the animal level. desired system sensitivity of 95% and farm level sensitivity of
5% were considered, as these would be values commonly used for
wo-stage sampling to determining disease-free status in a single
ampling campaign.ry Medicine 122 (2015) 355–362
2.2.5. RFs for introduction of infection at the farm-level
Sampling high-risk farms aids early disease detection and low-
ers sampling efforts for surveillance. Scientiﬁcally documented RFs
for introduction of shrimp viral diseases at grow-out farm level
need to be identiﬁed to perform targeted sampling of the high-risk
farm. However, in the absence of speciﬁc publications, RFs were
selected from the data collected in the census data for 2011. The
authors considered four RFs to be a reasonable number to allow
the differentiation of a sufﬁcient number of high-risk farms. The
high-risk grow-out farms were considered those where all four RFs
for the introduction of infection were present.
Farming intensities. When looking to enhance disease detection,
one should consider the intensity of farming practices. Frequently,
the intensity of farming can be inferred from both the size of the
farms and the density of shrimp cultivated in the grow-out ponds.
Larger farms are more likely to use large volumes of non-treated
water, receive numerous shipments of PL to stock the farms and are
subject to an increased movement of people, vehicles and animals,
which can serve as pathways for disease introduction (Lightner,
2005; Lotz, 1997). Therefore, the RF characterizing the type of
grow-out farm in terms of production was  considered. This RF was
present for large to medium scale grow-out farms, as the RF “cul-
tivating areas equal to or above 10 hectares”, absent for micro and
small producers, with lower cultivating areas.
Shrimp grow-out farms also differ in the densities of shrimp
cultivated per square meter. Farms in Ceará apply varying stock-
ing densities, irrespectively of farm size, increasing intensity of
shipments of PL onto the farm and increasing the risk of dis-
ease introduction. Furthermore, applying high stocking densities
to production systems without the proper management can lead
to increased stressing of the shrimp and risk of disease occurrence
(Kautsky et al., 2000). A second RF indicating the high density of
shrimp is therefore considered present as the RF “densities above
30 or more shrimp per square meter” are stocked, absent when
stocking densities are equal to or below this value. The values for
the aforementioned RFs were chosen as they are used in Brazil to
distinguish small and medium-scale farms ABCC/MPA (2013).
Biosecurity. Biosecurity measures are implemented at the aqua-
culture establishment to reduce the likelihood of introduction of
infectious pathogens (Lotz, 1997). Therefore, biosecurity measures
are important when determining which RFs to include in the model.
Pathogen exclusion is frequently accomplished by stocking farms
with controlled water sources and disease-free shrimp (Lightner,
2005). The importance of stocking farms with PL free from dis-
ease, either certiﬁed through rigorous testing or supplied as speciﬁc
pathogen free PL (SPF) is central to biosecurity in shrimp aquacul-
ture (Bray et al., 2004; Clifford and Cook, 2002; Corsin et al., 2005;
Hoa et al., 2005; Lightner, 2003, 2005; Lotz, 1997; Walker et al.,
2011). However, information on the use of SPF PL was  not avail-
able from the census that supplied the data for analysis. On the
other hand, the census did provide information on the main source
of water supplied to the farm. The water used for shrimp farm-
ing is considered as one of the most signiﬁcant ways of pathogens
introduction at the farm level (Moss et al., 2012). A third RF was
therefore considered, the use of “water from unprotected source”,
where water supplied from a source other than a well is regarded as
a source of pathogen introduction. Limiting pathogen introduction
can also be accomplished through “zero” water exchange (Lightner,
2005). A biosecure grow-out farm will limit water exchange by
means of a recirculating system (Lotz, 1997). Consequently, a fourth
RF was considered, the “absence of a recirculation system”. Since
there is no true “zero” water exchange and water can be supplied
from an unprotected source, these RFs are not considered depend-
ent nor redundant. Once more, the census provided information
on the water source and use of a recirculation system ABCC/MPA
(2013).









































Parameters for three levels of probability of disease awareness: low, medium and
high.
Probability of detection Minimum Most likely Maximum
Pert distribution
Low 0.1 0.2 0.3Fig. 3. The scenario tree for the passive surveillance system component.
.2.6. Relative risks
The accuracy of the model depends heavily on the values chosen
or this key model parameter. This is among one of the recogniz-
ble difﬁculties that currently limit the developing of RBS in the
quatic context. A common approach to estimating such parame-
ers is the use of information from expert panels. Experts in the ﬁeld
f shrimp health in Brazil that could provide adequate estimates are
carce. Furthermore, the reliability of any estimates that could be
rovided would be greatly uncertain, given the present knowledge
f occurrence of shrimp diseases in Brazil. The still-developing ﬁeld
f aquatic animal surveillance and speciﬁc epidemiological stud-
es also made literary references to support the choice of values
nattainable (Oidtmann et al., 2013; Peeler and Taylor, 2011).
Given the previous considerations, values for RR were assigned
rbitrarily in a conservative way that would reﬂect the underesti-
ation of the importance of any RF. The RFs were equally weighed
nd considered to have two mutually exclusive outcomes: pres-
nce or absence. When present, all RFs were parameterized with a
alue of RR modelled in R environment as Pert distributions with
inimum values of 1, most likely values of 2 and maximum values
f 3. These values translate into a minimum RR of one, a most-likely
alue of twice the risk of disease introduction for exposure to the
F and a maximum value of 3 times the risk to obtain a symmetri-
al Pert distribution. Where the RF was absent, RR was  appointed
 ﬁxed value of 1.
.3. Passive SSC
Passive surveillance is implemented for early detection of dis-
ase and can contribute to determining disease free status over
ime. Passive surveillance allows for the comprehensive coverage
f the shrimp grow-out farm population, as all units are potentially
ubject to surveillance. The unit of analysis for the SePassiveSC are
he shrimp grow-out farms.
.3.1. Scenario tree
Detecting disease through passive surveillance relies on the
robability that, at the farm level, infected animals show clinical
igns of disease, that aquaculturists are aware of these signs and
re motivated to report a suspected disease occurrence, that state
eterinary authorities investigate the event and correctly suspect
he occurrence of a speciﬁc viral disease and also on the diagnostic
apacity of the tests to detect and conﬁrm the presence of infec-
ion (Hadorn and Stark, 2008). The SePassiveSSC is determined
ccording to Martin et al. (2007). The scenario tree illustrating the
etection process for the PassiveSC is illustrated in Fig. 3.Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6
High 0.7 0.8 0.9
2.3.2. SePassiveSC
A simple approach was considered to calculate the SePassiveSC.
The unit sensitivity for the PassiveSC (SeHP), that is, the probabil-
ity that any randomly selected farm will give a positive test result,
considers the probability that infection will result in shrimp devel-
oping clinical signs of disease (PRClinicalSigns), the probability of
detection by aquaculturist (PrAquaculturist) and the probability
of further investigation by a veterinarian (PrVeterinarian), along
with the diagnostic test sensitivities (SeTests) and the number of
npassive farms tested from the N farms in the population (Eq. (8))
(E. Sergeant, personal communication, May  28, 2015). We  consider
that the shrimp sent for testing are infected and so the proba-
bility Psampled ﬁsh infected was set at 1. For the present example, we
considered the PassiveSC would sample 10 farms (npassive).
SeHP = Pr Clinical Signs ∗ Pr Aquaculturist ∗ Pr Veterinarian
∗ (1 − (1 − Psampled fish infected ∗ SeTests)npassive ) (8)
The SePassiveSC can then be determined through Eq. ((9)) (E.
Sergeant, personal communication, May  28, 2015).
SePassiveSC = 1 − (1 − SeHP)(Ph∗∗N) (9)
2.3.3. PassiveSC probabilities
The probabilities of the aquaculturist detecting symptoms of
disease and contacting state veterinary authorities, and that state
veterinary authorities suspect disease and conduct further inves-
tigation by sending samples for testing, can be considered for
varying levels of disease awareness. These levels of varying aware-
ness were parameterized according to Hadorn and Stark (2008) for
three levels of low, medium and high disease awareness (Table 1).
The level considered for analysis to conservatively represent the
present level of awareness, is the lowest of these levels. Increment-
ing disease awareness may  increase the SePassiveSC and can also
be determined through the AquaVigil model.
The probability that animals show clinical signs of disease is
difﬁcult to determine for the listed notiﬁable viral shrimp diseases.
Evidence suggests that long-term viral infections, such as WSSV,
can be present without producing clinical signs of disease and
disease outbreaks (Tsai et al., 1999). For this reason, the authors
determined that a conservatively wide range of values should
parameterize the Pert distribution for the probability of shrimp
showing clinical signs of any listed viral disease, and so a mini-
mum  value of 1%, a most likely value of 5% and a maximum value
of 10% were chosen.
2.4. Surveillance system sensitivity
The overall SSe of the AquaVigil model worked example for the
state of Ceará was  determined assuming the independence of the
active and passive surveillance components (Eq. (10)) (Cameron,
2009).
SSe = 1 − (1 − SeActiveSSC) ∗ (1 − SePassiveSSC) (10)



























































Scenario 1 sampling strategies to reach a probability of freedom superior or equal
to  94.5% for the state of Ceará.
Sampling frame Required sampling
High-risk farms Animals per farm Campaigns Total samples
50 32 1 1600
45  32 1 1440
40  32 1 1280
35  32 1 112060 A.R. Marques et al. / Preventive Ve
.5. Probability of freedom
The probability of freedom can be determined at the end of
 surveillance period, when evaluating the information gathered
hrough the surveillance components. The method to determine
he probability of freedom also followed Martin et al. (2007). Using
ayes’ theorem, the probability of the state being free from dis-
ase depends on the value of SSe and the prior probability that
isease is present before the surveillance efforts are undergone.
he authors selected an initial prior for the probability of freedom
arameterized as an uninformed prior with a value of 0.5, for a 50%
robability of disease presence or absence, following the example
rom terrestrial animal surveillance systems for disease freedom by
artin (2008) and More et al. (2009). It is important to mention that
he aforementioned value, chosen by the authors in the absence of
urveillance data, can inevitably bias disease freedom conclusions
Gustafson et al., 2010).
The AquaVigil model outputs the number of campaigns needed
o achieve a desired probability of freedom when the same surveil-
ance sampling strategy is repeatedly applied for active and passive
urveillance, over what may  be many periods of time. The proba-
ility of freedom is determined at the end of every surveillance
ampaign, in most cases, increasing the probability that the dis-
ase will be absent at the beginning of the next surveillance time
eriod (TP). Considering the SSe and prior probability of freedom for
he time period PriorTP, a posterior value of probability of freedom
PostPrFree) is determined from Eq. ((11)) (Martin et al., 2007).
ostPrFreeTP = (1 − PriorTP)/(1 − PriorTP ∗ SSeTP) (11)
here is a need to consider that, during a time period, disease
ay  be introduced into the state and so the value of PostPrFree
s adjusted. In Brazil, import risk analysis minimizes the probabil-
ty of disease entering the country (PrIntro), as does the signiﬁcant
eographic distance from other South American shrimp produc-
ng countries. In Ceará, the main route for disease introduction is
hrough the uncontrolled movement of crustaceans and through
he oceanic currents from neighbouring states. To account for the
ossibility of introduction of disease, the PrIntro was parameter-
zed by the authors as a Pert distribution of minimum 1%, most
ikely 1,5% and maximum 2%, for a conservatively high estimate
hen compared to the values used for land-animal production
ystems, such as the point estimate in Frossling et al. (2009) of
.833%. The value of PostPrFreeadjusted is determined from the value
f posterior probability of infection (PostPrInfadjusted) (Eq. (12)) in
q. ((13)) (Cameron, 2009).
ostPrInfadjusted = PostPrInf + PrIntro − PostPrInf ∗ PrIntro (12)
ostPrFreeadjusted = 1 − PostPrInfadjusted (13)
.6. Relationship between variables
The model output included a sensitivity analysis between RFs
nd the SeActiveSC and between the probabilities considered for
he passive component and the value of SePassiveSC. Spearman
ank-order correlation coefﬁcients can identify which RFs and
robabilities are most correlated to the values of both SeActiveSC
nd SePassiveSC. The model returns the values of the Spearman’s
orrelation coefﬁcient as a tornado plot. Values close to −1 and 1
ndicate that the variables are highly negatively and positively cor-
elated, respectively. The Spearman’s correlation coefﬁcients are
etermined and tested for statistical signiﬁcance by constructing a
est statistic t, where statistically signiﬁcant Spearman rank-order
orrelations have an associated p-value of less than 5%. Correlation
oefﬁcients and signiﬁcance test are determined through the Hmisc
ackage (Harrell Jr., 2015).30  32 1 960
25  32 1 800
20  32 2 1280
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Best sampling strategy for high-risk farm sampling
The sampling strategy for RBS considered the exclusive targeted
sampling of high-risk grow-out farms, and therefore, farms with all
four RFs. From the 325 grow-out farms in Ceará, 50 farms are char-
acterized by the presence of all four RFs. Lower numbers of farms
were sampled from then on, for 45, 40, 35, 30, 25 and 20 high-risk
farms, to identify a more practical and cost-effective surveillance
strategy. The number of animals to sample from each farm for rep-
resentative random sampling is 32 and this was  the value chosen
for analysis.
The PassiveSC can contribute to increase SSe and inﬂuence the
total number of campaigns needed to achieve the desired probabil-
ity of freedom. Therefore, we  can determine how many sampling
campaigns and animals are needed for sampling with or without
the contribution from this type of surveillance activity. Further-
more, we  can consider the contribution from this surveillance
component when awareness is high among farmers and veterinar-
ians. Therefore, the number of campaigns, animals sampled and
the surveillance system performance can be determined for three
scenarios:
• Scenario 1: implementing only the ActiveSC.
• Scenario 2: implementing the ActiveSC and the PassiveSC with
low disease awareness.
• Scenario 3: implementing the ActiveSC and the PassiveSC with
high disease awareness.
3.1.1. Scenario 1
For scenario 1, the best sampling strategy for targeted sampling
is that where 25 high-risk farms are sampled, for a total of 800 sam-
pled animals and a single surveillance campaign (Table 2). Random
and representative two-stage sampling of Ceará’s 325 farms, would
require 1856 animals to be sampled from 58 farms, sampling 32
animals per farm, to declare disease free status with a single surveil-
lance campaign. Applying the previous targeted sampling strategy
would account for a reduction of 56.9% in number of farms and of
animals needed for testing to declare freedom from any one of the
listed notiﬁable viral diseases. Furthermore, if pooled sampling of
5 animals were considered, the overall number of diagnostic tests
needed to declare freedom would fall from 800 to 160. However, if
pooling of samples were to be done, as is frequent in aquatic animal
diagnostics, PCR test performance could be affected and values for
test sensitivity and speciﬁcity reconsidered. However, examples of
surveys to determine disease freedom consider that the sensitiv-
ity of pooled testing is high, surpassing the value here chosen (OIE,
2014a).If the surveillance strategy were to privilege a lower sample size
per campaign and active surveillance for a two-year period, the best
strategy is the sampling of 20 high-risk farms, for a total of 1280
samples, collecting 640 animals per campaign.
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Table  3
Scenario 2 surveillance system component sensitivities, overall SSes and SRs for surveillance sampling frames analysed for the state of Ceará, with corresponding 2.5%tiles
and  97.5%tiles.
Sampling Frame Surveillance system performance
High-risk farms Animals per farm SeActiveSC SePassiveSC SSe SR
50 32 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 1.06
45  32 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 1.08
40  32 99.94% (99.66%; 99.97%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 99.94% (99.67%; 99.99%) 1.10
35  32 99.66% (98.73%; 99.89%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 99.67% (98.77%; 99.90%) 1.15
30  32 98.76% (96.55%; 99.49%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 98.80% (96.65%; 99.51%) 1.22
25  32 96.50% (92.34%; 98.22%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 96.62% (92.57%; 98.28%) 1.30
20  32 91.69% (85.13%; 94.95%) 3.10% (1.10%; 6.50%) 91.96% (85.57%; 95.13%) 1.37
Table 4
Scenario 3 surveillance system component sensitivities, overall SSes and SRs for surveillance sampling frames analysed for the state of Ceará, with corresponding 2.5% tiles
and  97.5% tiles.
Sampling Frame Surveillance system performance
High-risk farms Animals per farm SeActiveSC SePassiveSC SSe SR
50 32 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 1.06
45  32 100.0% (100.0%; 100.0%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 100.0% (99.97%; 100.0%) 1.08
40  32 99.94% (99.66%; 99.97%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 99.97% (99.79%; 99.99%) 1.10
35  32 99.66% (98.73%; 99.89%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 99.81% (99.20%; 99.94%) 1.15
30  32 98.76% (96.55%; 99.49%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 99.29% (97.82%; 99.73%) 1.22
25  32 96.50% (92.34%; 98.22%) 41.64% (19.26%; 60.28%) 97.97% (95.08%; 99.09%) 1.30




















sFig. 4. Tornado plots of Spearman correlation coefﬁcients to identify the v
.1.2. Scenario 2
We can consider the contribution of the SePassiveSC to deter-
ine the number of campaigns and samples needed to determine
isease free status. Here we conservatively estimated that 10 farms
ould have samples submitted for diagnostic exams through the
assiveSC. We  veriﬁed that, for Scenario 2, where the level of aware-
ess is low among the farmers and veterinarians, the PassiveSC
oes not contribute to increase the value of the SSe to the point of
hanging the number of samples or campaigns needed to establish
isease free status. The sampling frame and number of campaigns
o determine disease free status is the same as that presented for
cenario 1 and so is the best sampling strategy. The values for
eActiveSC and SePassiveSC, overall SSe and SR for Scenario 2 are
ummarized in Table 3.
.1.3. Scenario 3
For Scenario 3 we consider the increase of the level of disease
wareness. There is an increase in SePassive contributing to the
ncrease in overall SSe (Table 4). However, the increase in overall
Se does not translate into a change in number of samples required
o determine freedom from disease in comparison to the previous
cenarios.les most correlated with the values of SeActiveSC (a) and SePassiveSC (b).
3.2. SR and relationship between variables
All SR values are above one, indicating a gain of sensitivity when
performing RBS compared to an equivalent random sampling.
The AquaVigil model output included tornado plots of Spear-
man  correlation coefﬁcients for sensitivity analysis that identiﬁed
the inputs most correlated to the values of SePassiveSC and SeAc-
tiveSC. For the chosen surveillance strategy rendering the smallest
sample size and low awareness, the RF with the greatest correlation
relationship to the value of SeActiveSC was RF1, the aquaculture
grow-out farms with cultivating areas above 10 ha. The sensitivity
analysis, given the same surveillance scenario, for the SePassiveSC,
identiﬁed the probability of infected animals showing clinical signs
of disease as the input variable with the greatest correlation rela-
tionship for this value (Fig. 4).
4. ConclusionThe prospective evaluation of different surveillance strategies
allowed the identiﬁcation of the best strategy to declare freedom
from any listed notiﬁable viral disease affecting shrimp aquaculture











































associated with disease outbreaks in ponds seeded with uninfected postlarvae.62 A.R. Marques et al. / Preventive Ve
nto account four RFs, among a wide range of other model param-
ters, returning the surveillance system performance before its
pplication. The arbitrarity behind the choice of important model
arameters inevitably alters the accuracy of the model. However,
hrough their conservative estimation, the model can make disease
reedom declaration a reality in the present context. Furthermore,
t is important to state that the parameters can be changed as seen
t to evaluate different surveillance scenarios, as changes in any
uture context can occur and speciﬁc information made available.
This model provides decision makers with a tool for strategical
lanning of future surveillance activities capable of early detection
f disease and, in the event of sampling efforts failing to detect dis-
ase, to declare disease freedom. The model can also be applied to
valuate real data from the surveillance system once implemented,
hen a single sampling campaign is deemed sufﬁcient to determine
isease-free status or when the sampling protocol is repeated for
onsecutive surveillance campaigns. The AquaVigil model can eval-
ate other surveillance strategies for varying production systems,
iseases and surveillance scenarios, provided they follow a similar
urveillance outline.
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